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FUND'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Second Injury Fund for the State of Utah is requesting
this Court
in

rehear

and

reverse its decision filed May 1, 1984

the matter of American Coal Co ..

Emery Mining Corp., and the

Utah State Insu rnnce Fundy. Terry W. Sandstrom. Industrial Commission
of Utah,

and Second Injury Fund.

of Utah Code Ann.,

Section 35-1-69

In interpreting the provisions
(1953, as amended 1981), this

Court held that:
The third paragraph then, read in light of
the first paragraph, provides that the insurance
carrier, while initially responsible for
all temporary disability benefits and expenses,
must be reimbursed for that percentage of
the temporary disability expenses attributable
to the pre-existing disability once the determination of combined disability is made.
Not only does this interpretatio provide
a consistent reading of the Section, but
it also meets the recognized statutory purpose,

which is to encourage employers to hire disabled
persons. To make an employer and its insurance
carrier not only initially, but also finally,
liable for all temporary disability expenses,
even though directly attributable to a preexisting injury, would undeniably defeat
this purpose •
.L:j.

at pp. 4-5 (citation omitted).
The Second Injury Fund now requests rehearing on this decision

based on numerous affidavits from legislative members and members
of the Advisory Board for the Industrial Commission which are
offered to show that this Court misinterpreted the legislative
intent in making its determination of the issues on appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE UTAH STATE
INSURANCE FUND ON REHEARING
The Utah State Insurance Fund requests this Court uphold
its decision previously entered in this matter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF AN ENACTMENT IS
TO BE DETERMINED FIRST OF ALL FROM THE LANGUAGE
OF THAT ENACTMENT.
The Second Injury Fund, in its brief, goes through a lengthy
discussion supported by the affidavits of legislators and Advisory
Board members which is intended to show that the interpretation
this Court made of Section 69 based on the language of the 1981
enactments is in contrast with the actual intent of individuals
involved in the drafting and support of the legislative enactment.
This Court has determined on numerous occasions prior to the
1981 amendments to Section 69 that medical expenses and temporary
2

total disability compensation were items that should be apportioned
between an employer and its insurance carrier and the Second
Injury Fund where there are combined disabilities resulting from
both pre-existing conditions and the industrial accident in question.
Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano,
334

(1980); White v.

(1979);
P.2d 617

Industrial Commission, Utah,

Intermountain Health Care,
(1977).

Utah,

610 P.2d

604 P.2d 478

Inc. y. Ortega,

Utah,

562

The determination in each of those cases was

based on the language included in Section 69 that reads as follows:
• • • but the liability of the employer for
such compensation and medical care shall
be for the industrial injury only and the
remainder shall be paid out of a special
fund provided for in Section 35-1-68(1).
As this Court adequately pointed out in its decision on May 1,
1984

in. this case,

that language was left substantially intact

in 1981 with minor wording changes which are not relevant to
this appeal.

It presently reads:

• but the liability of the employer for
such compensation, medical care, and other
related items shall be for the industrial
injury only and the remainder shall be paid
out of the Second Injury Fund provided for
in Section 35-1-68(1).
This Court, citing to Christensen y. Industrial Commission, Utah,
642 P.2d 755

(1982), determined that "absent substantial evidence

to the contrary, the Legislature is presumed to have been satisfied
with prior

judicial constructions of the unaltered portions of

the statute and to have adopted those constructions as consistent
with its own intent."

American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom,

(filed May 1, 1984), p. 3.
3

P.2d

It is still

undisputed

in this case

that were this Court

to uphold the decision of the Industrial Commission which disallows
any contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the State Insurance
Fund for Mr. Sandstrom' s

pre-existing conditions;

the Utah State

Insurance Fund would, in fact, be paying for more than the amounts
caused by the industrial

injury.

disability subsequent to an
function of the extent to
injuries or

impairments

A person's amount of temporary

industrial accident is a combined

which that person had pre-existing

and the extent to which the industrial

incident affected those pre-existing conditions.
If the

intent of the Utah State Legislature in passing the

1981 amendments

to

Section 69 was

to saddle the employer with

the entire liability for temporary total compensation and medical
benefits, it was within the prerogative of the Utah State Legislature
to change the above cited language.
therefore it

is this Court's

responsibility in determining the

intent of the Legislature to first
by the Legislature.

Such a change was not made;

look

to

the language used

The legislative body is deemed to have spoken

as a group and not as

individual members;

therefore legislative

intent its elf is contained in the enactment.

Provisions of the

1981 enactment are directly in line with the language that existed
in Section 69 prior to that enactment, and the provisions clearly
limit the liablity of an employer to medical expenses and compensation
payments resulting from the industrial injury only.

4

POINT II
DEPOSITIONS OR AFFIDAVITS OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS OR DRAFTERS OF THE LEGISLATION ARE
NOT COMPETENT OR ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
It
what

is an unassailable

individual

rule of statutory construction that

legislators,

legislative drafters, lobbyists,

or other individuals involved in the legislative process believe
as to the intent of a specific enactment is not competent evidence
for

establishing legislative intent and will not be

to by a court in making such determination.
case

referred

In a recent Washington

in which the Washington State Supreme Court was asked to

interpret the provisions of an osteopath licensing bill, the
Court made the following statement:
Woodson (appellant therein) provided this
Court with affidavits from some members of
the 1959 Legislature.
It was done in an
effort to establish that they were under
the impression that the holders of "limited
certificates" could employ drugs. Legislative
intent in passing the statute cannot be shown
by depositions and affidavits of individual
state legislators, however.
Woodson y. State,
omitted).
Court,
general

623 P.2d 683,

686-87

(Wash. 1980)

(citation

In another Washington case the Washington Supreme

in addressing legislative appropriations involved in a
assistance welfare program,

expressed its opinion of

the effect of an affidavit of a legislator as follows:
What one legislator may have believed does
not establish that the Legislature intended
something contrary to its express declaration • • • •
Pannell v. Thompson, 589 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Wash. 1979).
5

The Oregon Court of Appeals

also

addressed

the

issue of

what effect the impressions of individual legislators or lobbyists
had in determining legislative intent in their construction of
an employment agency licensing enactment in the State of Oregon.
In that case the Oregon Court noted:
The Commissioner, in trying to determine
legislative intent, took testimony from persons
interested in the legislation (possibly lobbyists)
about their observations of what occurred
and what the legislators were intending.
Such evidence is incompetent for this purpose,
just as the testimony of an individual legislator
would be.
2A Sands. Sutherland. Statutory
Construction. Sections 48.10 and 48.17 (4th
Ed. 1973).
Murphy y. Nilsen,

527 P.2d 736,

738

(Ore. App. 1974),

It

would

appear that the Oregon Court was addressing the type of testimony
that the Second Injury Fund attempts to present herein through
the affidavits of members of the
Commission.

It

is the contention of

Board to the Industrial
the Utah State Insurance

Fund that such evidence, as the Oregon Court indicated, is incompetent
for such purpose.
The Kansas Court of Appeals was asked to determine the meaning
of legislative language defining survivor's benefits in a personal
injury protection endorsement of an automobile liability insurance
policy in the case of Hand y. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Company,

577 P.2d 1202

(Kan. App. 1978).

After being presented

an affidavit of the chairman of the House subcommittee responsible
for the legislation, the Kansas Court stated as follows:
We are unable to square the affiant 's statements
with the facts of the legislative action.
We believe the latter speaks more loudly
6

and we are unaware of precedent for judicial
ascertainment of legislative intent through
statements of legislators made years after
the event.
l.Q. at 1205.

The Kansas Court did state that the proper considera-

tions of legislative history a court can consider are "historical
background, legislative proceedings, and changes made in a proposed
law during the course of its enactment may be properly considered
in determining legislative intent" (citations omitted).

Lj_.

In 1976 the California Supreme Court was asked to construe
the meaning of a statute of limitations in a medical malpractice
act.

The defendants

in that case attempted to establish the

intent of the Legislature by introducing affidavits of three
members of the Legislature who were involved in the passage of
the provision the Court was construing.
was

very clear

The California Court

regarding the effect of such affidavits when it

stated:
The declaration of individual legislators
as to the intent of the Legislature in enacting
a statute are afforded little weight.
Larcher v. Wanless, 557 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1976) at 510-511 (citation
omitted) •
The Arizona Supreme Court was asked in another case to construe
the provisions of a revenue and taxation act passed by the Arizona
Legislature in Golder y. Dept. of Reyenue. State Board of Taxation,
599 P.2d 216

(Ariz. 1979).

In

the Court was very explicit

regarding the effect of the legislator's statements in determining
legislative intent.

7

The rule is clearly established in Arizona
that one member of a legislature which passes
a law is not competent to testify regarding
the intent of the legislature in passing
the law.
Barlow y. Jones, 37 Ariz. 396,
294 P. 1106 (1930); State Tax Commission
y. Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial
14 Ariz. App. 554, 557, 485 P.2d 277, 280
(1971); Tucson Gas & Electric Co. y. Schantz,
5 Ariz. App. 511, 514-515, 428 P.2d 686,
689-690 (1967). "The intent of the legislature
can only be determined by the language used,
aided by the canons and rules of construction
founded upon reason and experience."
y. Jones, 37 Ariz. at 399, 294 P. at 1107.
The same logic which prevents one legislator
from putting a gloss on the meaning of a
statute based only upon his own individual
feelings also prevents a lobbyist or other
interested party from doing the same.
The
testimony of the witnesses Arnold and Killian
passing A.R.S. Section 42-123 was completely
incompetent and must be disregarded in interpreting the meaning of that provision.
lij. at 221.

The Alaska Court, in Kenai Peninsula Burrough y. Kenai Peninsula
Education, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977), was asked to use the opinion
expressed in a letter by a

legislator to determine the intent

of the Legislature in passing a public employee collective bargaining
act.

The Court said such evidence was

incompetent in making

such a determination, and reliance on it would be error impermissible
under previous Alaska cases.

They finally held:

Resort to the letter as means of legal interpretation was, therefore, error.
l.Q. at 423.

See also:

Haynes y. Caooral, 571 P.2d 430 (Okla. 1977);

Southern Railway Co. y. A. O. Smith Con>.,
213 S.E.2d 903
N.E.2d 861

(1975);

134 Ga. App.

219,

Financial Indemnity Co. y. Camile,

288

(Ohio 1972); Leyy y. State Board of Examiners,

553

8

S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. 1977).
It
the

is clear that the affidavits appended to the brief of

Second Injury Fund in support of its petition for

rehearing

in this case are not competent evidence to establish the intent
of the Utah Legislature in drafting the 1981 amendments to Section
69.

While counsel

for

the Utah State Insurance Fund has been

unable to find a Utah case adopting the above cited rule of law,
it is clear from the language used by courts making such a determination that there is a strong policy against allowing the testimony
of

individual

legislators to be used in determining the intent

of an entire legislative body.

Such policy should be adopted

by this Court as the policy of the State of Utah in order to
avoid plunging Utah state courts
of

into the impossible position

weighing conflicting testimony of

and

individual legislators,

in determining the credibility of individual legislators

when conflicts arise in individual affidavits.

The Legislature

has the full capacity to specify its intent by a clear and concise
drafting of the statutory language itself which should express
the intent of the body.
The

Legislature,

by its

clear and unequivocal language,

intended that an employer not be liable for
or medical
an

benefits

industrial

that

injury.

any compensation

in excess of that amount attributable to
The Second Injury Fund cannot contradict

legislative intent embodied in the enactment itself.

Any

other interpretation of Section 69 requires an extremely tortured
interpretation of that requirement.
9

POINT III
EVIDENTIARY SUPPLEMENTATION OF
AT THIS POINT IS UNTIMELY.

THE

From the time of the evidentiary hearing,

RECORD
during which the

Administrative Law Judge rejected the Utah State Insurance Fund's
contention that it be entitled to
total

reimbursement for

temporary

compensation and medical benefits paid to Mr. Sandstrom,

the Second Injury Fund has been aware that the issue involved
in this case would be what the Legislature intended in its 1981
amendments

to

Utah Code Ann.,

Section 35-1-69.

At no time in

its response to the Utah State Insurance Fund's Motion for Review
did the Second Injury Fund introduce the affidavits of individual
legislators to explain the intent of Section 69.
brief on the
Fund did

initial appeal

in this

In its responsive

action the Second

rely on statements contained

in the official

Injury
records

of the Utah Legislature which this Court could properly take
judicial notice of in support of

its position on legislative

intent, but at no time did it attempt to introduce the affidavits
of individual legislators.

It appears contrary to proper appellate

practice to, at this late date on petition for rehearing, introduce
numerous affidavits of legislators and members of the Advisory
Board not contained

in any official

record of the Legislature

and which are not matters of which this Court can take
notice; but are,

in fact,

factual

on appeal.

10

judicial

supplementations of the record

CONCLUSION
This Court should not reverse the determination previously
made in this action granting the Utah State Insurance Fund reimbursement for a portion of temporary total compensation and medical
benefits attributable to pre-existing conditions of Mr. Sandstrom.
The majority clearly pointed out

in the previous decision of

this case that the Legislature had continued, even in the 1981
amendments to Section 69, to limit the liability of an employer
to that portion of medical benefits and compensation attributable
to the industrial injury, and had not made a change to that provision.

The Second

by introducing

Injury Fund tries to overturn that decision

inadmissible and incompetent evidence at this

late date from individual legislators, contrary to the well established rule of law that such is not admissible to establish legislative intent.
Most importantly, as observed by this Court in its initial
decision, determination that an employer would not be reimbursed
for

temporary total compensation and medical benefits that were

attributable to a pre-existing condition would fly in the face
of the statutory purpose of Utah Code Ann.,

Section 35-1-69,

which is to encourage employers to hire and retain handicapped
workers.
DATED

tr_
of July, 1984.
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